Victor Fersht, professor of Far Eastern State Academy of Economics and Management
Transition states and transnational migration
The transition states of the Europe and Central Asia region contain about 7 percent of the worlds population but have about 15 percent of the worlds refugees and internally displaced people. Other estimates place the regions share of refugees and displaced people at closer to 30 percent. In most cases the conditions that caused these population displacements are unresolved and the affected people remain in a state of permanent migration.
In my mind I wholly agree on this matter with Tim Heleniak from the World Banks Development Data Group. He researches and writes on internal and international migration in the Europe and Central Asia region. Here I often quote him because he first comes to such results.
The recent episode of ethnic cleansing and forced ethnic migration in Kosovo is, unfortunately, all too common among the transition states of Europe and Asia. The emergence of new independent statesmany resulting from the breakups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the liberalization of political regimes across the regionhas spawned a number of different migration streams, many of them forced.
Each of the transition states has become more ethnically homogeneous since the beginning of the decade as a result of the ethnic immixing that has been the primary, but not sole, cause of the migration.
During the Soviet period a tight lid was kept on the nationalist and territorial aspirations of various ethnic groups. Suppressed ethnic grievances and territorial claims have come into the open as the result of the end of the cold war and the liberalization that contributed to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. As new states seek to correct these grievances or assert claims, other ethnic groups are excluded.
The response of many has been to migrate back to what they perceive to be their ethnic homelands. This massive, unplanned, and chaotic ethnic immixing has had a negative impact on development and has led to increased poverty at a time when the states are also transforming their economies away from the centrally planned models they used for decades.
With most of the armed hostilities in the former Soviet Union having died down, much of international communitys attention has focused on the repatriation of 1 million refugees and 1 million internally displaced people and on the rebuilding of Kosovo. It should be kept in mind that the consequences of armed ethnic conflicts linger long after hostilities have ended and disappeared from the headlines.
A number of potentially explosive situations remain in the former Soviet Unionand elsewhere in the regionto which durable political solutions have yet to be found. A number of "pseudo states" existregions within sovereign states that operate autonomously but are not recognized as independent by any other country. These include the regions of Moldova, Azerbaijan, the Chechen republic within Russia, Georgia, and the Kosovo region within Yugoslavia. In all of these areas the push for autonomy or territorial claims has resulted in ethnic violence and population displacement. The resolution of these conflicts may cause further displacement.
Migration has always played a role in state building or unbuilding. Thus, it should come as no surprise that there has been so much migration as the number of states in the Europe and Central Asia region has increased from eight at the beginning of the decade to the current 27.
Only five states in the region remain within the same borders as at the beginning of transition. Most of the new, or newly independent states are the homelands of a titular ethnic group who have the goal of making state and nation consistent, often with greatly exaggerated or conflicting claims of homeland. This has led to a number of episodes of forced migration, as well as no coerced ethnic immixing. Little of the bloody ethnic immixing of the former Soviet Union has been directed at Russians; however, the largest number of Russians has migrated back to Russia from areas where ethnic violence is the greatest.
In the new states of the former Soviet Union, much of the increase in ethnic homogeneity has been due to the return migration of more than 10 percent of the Russian Diaspora population from the non-Russian states.
The rate of return among the states varies considerably, ranging from 50 percent in the three states and Tajikistan to barely 1 percent from Ukraine and Belarus. While the return migration of nearly 3 million Russians is considerable and has placed great strains on the depressed Russian economy to absorb them, most Russians outside Russia were reluctant to migrate.
Russia realized the potential burden of absorbing 25 million Russians from non-Russian states, and discouraged migration while helping the expatriots feel part of the Russian nation by persuading the states to allow dual citizenship. Thus, with a few exceptions, most of the non-Russian successor states are embarking on state building with significant minorities of Russians and other nationalities.
The mosaic of nationalities in the Caucasus region has been the area of some of the most violent and severe ethnic unmixing in the former Soviet Union. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over control of the Armenia-majority enclave has caused an estimated half of million Armenians to leave Azerbaijan. Another half of million internally displaced people remain in Azerbaijan.
The separatist movements in Georgia have caused an estimated quarter of million displaced people. At its peak the civil war in Tajikistan caused the displacement of one million people, 700,000 of them internally. Few years ago peace agreement had been reached and a majority of those displaced have returned.
Even two of the relatively peaceful and prosperous Baltic statesLatvia and Estoniahave been taken to task by the international community over their exclusion of large Russian-speaking populations through restrictive citizenship and language laws.
The four-year war in Bosnia and current dispute in Kosovo are rather well known. At the end of 1997 nearly one million Bosnians remained internally displaced. More than 600,000 Bosnian refugees remained outside the country and 40,000 refugees from Croatia were in Bosnia. An intentionally decentralized state consisting of the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic continue the difficult rebuilding process there. The recent end to hostilities in Kosovo has allowed a tentative start to the repatriation of Kosovars and to the reconstruction of infrastructure. Still, the Serbian government views Kosovo as part of the Serbian homeland.
During the 1990s some titular members of the newly independent states tried to correct what they perceived as historical wrongs by giving preference to their ethnic group, often by arbitrarily defining citizenship or introducing discriminatory laws. The majority of states, however, are trying to walk the fine line between creating a homeland for members of the titular nationality while also accommodating minority nationalities. Kazakhstan, with its large Russian population, is a good example of this balanced policy.
A number of factors dictate the level of migration and the degree to which it is forced. These have to do with the characteristics of the diaspora group, the homeland, and the host country.
Size, history, rooted ness, and geographic concentration characterize the diaspora group. Russian populations in non-Russian states tend to be large and concentrated, usually in the capital cities. Most were born in these non-Russian states.
A homelands attitude toward the diaspora community affects migration at both formal and informal levels, which translates into how much of a pull factor it becomes. Some states such as Kazakhstan and the Baltics automatically grant citizenship to members of the titular ethnic group anywhere in the world. Others, such as Hungary, took a more neutral approach to its diaspora members. Hungary, while recognizing that Hungarians living in neighboring states are part of the Hungarian nation, is not ready to offer nonresident citizenshipthis is done to preserve good relations with those bordering countries that were established in the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian empire, inheriting millions of Hungarians. Germany and Israel are two homelands that have greatly affected migration patterns in the region by inducing a mass migration of German and Jewish populations.
As previously mentioned, the characteristics of the host nation toward ethnic minorities and the degree of social inclusion have been among the largest factors influencing either coerced or no coerced ethnic unmixing.
This recent and ongoing population displacement has negatively affected social development in the region by increased uncertainty among those affected, fragmentation of social relationships, loss of livelihood and savings, increased poverty, and necessary adjustments to new surroundings and new social institutions. Many migrants have been forced to make difficult adjustments.
Urban Russians from the non-Russian states, for example, have been directed to live in rural areas that they are unaccustomed to. Many of the displaced remain in limbo, wanting to return to their homelands or integrate into the resident societies, but are bared from doing so. At the same time, a country unable to handle its large minorities, and which forces them into uncertain status, will sooner or later be destabilized itself.
Today we come together to make new step in world migration politics. I hope that our mutual efforts will help all people and UN HABITAT successfully prepare migration report for Barcelona and for the future.
And now about situation with migration polices in Russia. Because Russia is only transitional country where you can find everything: from everyday attack of terrorists to very complicated situation with migration.
One of the most prevalent myths of the 90s was that Russia was soon going to be overwhelmed by a wave of immigration. Sure, we have witnessed some kind of change in this area. Nonetheless, migrant numbers and qualitative changes in migration patterns are two different things. In fact, in the ten years since the USSR fell apart, the number of immigrants to Russia has not changed compared to the 1980s. The increase in the migration balance, estimated at over four million people, is the result of a dramatic decrease in emigration from Russia.
In the last several years Russian Government have been constantly repeating that our strategic fate in terms of migration is to welcome immigrants, and therefore we need not barriers, but smart policy to settle these people. For example we have more than 2 millions Chinese migrants, but we dont need to limit them; we need to distribute them evenly, integrating their enclaves with communities of Koreans, Vietnamese, and so forth.
Mixing populations will reduce the threat of Russia losing territory in the long term. The best way let them balance each other out. If we think that an area is strategically important, we need to support the areas connections via people, transportation, etc. We need to analyze the types that predominate among these people and the way they settle into communities. Vietnamese and Koreans cant create communities on the border which could then be united with their countries. That would make no sense, as there is no common border.
The Chinese on the other hand do have an interest in increasing the size of their territory at the expense of their neighbors. Russian government need to think all this through and act accordingly, instead of waiting until an area becomes totally devoid of people and then overrun by migrants we cant deal with.
One of the conclusions of the opponents to liberalizing migration legislation is that Russia is losing money due to immigrant remittances. Just like other countries where immigrants work. But Russia also exports coal, for example. Yes, transitional countries are losing remittances, but in return they get labor and the products it produces. This loss, by the way, would be less if transitional countries had a normal banking system and banks took a percentage. Now migrants send cash. But that is really not the most important issue. No one has ever counted how many companies saved themselves from bankruptcy in the early 90s thanks to their workforce. For example Moscows bus and tram depots cant find enough drivers to work for their ridiculous salaries. Do you know how Ukrainian drivers live? We conducted some research in 2003. They have two drivers for one bed. One works, the other sleeps. By any standard these are inhuman conditions, but people still agreed to them. They were even willing to work fourteen hours a day in order to earn some money to go home.
Black market for labor makes up about a third of the total labor market in Russia and in other transitional countries. I cant imagine how, say, Sverdlovsk Province would get along without it. The entire workforce is from Kazakhstan. Of course, without the proper permissions. Russians work the same way in Kazakhstan. The majority of countries react in the following way to illegal migrants. If a person has been living and working in a country for several years illegally but breaks no other laws, this person is given the right to legalize. The length of migrants stays work in their favor, and legalization become a sort of amnesty. Russia unfortunately has never conducted any legalization measures in the post-Soviet era. The labor deficit is growing. Russia especially needs construction workers in the big cities, and drivers for public transportation in Moscow and other cities with populations of more than a million. Russia like every transitional country really need unskilled labor, work that Russians wont agree to do.
While Russia is in urgent need of migrant labor, for a decade attempts to introduce new immigration laws have been frustrated by parliament. At last, in June 2002, new legislation was introduced which for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 introduces a system of residence permits for migrant workers. Human rights groups, however, believe the legislation, with its draconian deportation measures, will make the situation of migrant workers even harder.
Russia's population has fallen from 149 million a decade ago to just over 144 million today. But even though Russia is facing a demographic crisis so dire that its population could shrink by half within 50 years, the issue of immigration is so sensitive that Russian leaders refuse even to discuss it. While birthrates have fallen far below levels that would sustain the population, death-rates, particularly among working-class males, have skyrocketed due to post-Soviet poverty, substance abuse, disease, stress and other ills. In fact, in twenty years time, there could be one pensioner for every worker in Russia.
I live on other side of Russia very far from Moskow and can witness that whole regions of Siberia and the Russian Far East are already depopulated, and new deserts are appearing even in former 'black earth' regions of central Russia.
The head of migration studies at the Institute of Social and Economic Population Studies in Moscow says that 'the only acceptable source of immigrants for us are the Russian-speaking populations of the former Soviet countries in the CIS' but that flow is slowly driving up. But Alexander Belyakov, a pro-Kremlin parliamentarian and head of the Duma's Resources Committee says 'We will encourage people to come from CIS countries, but Russia does not need any other immigrants.'
Experts say that Russia not only has no immigration strategy, it has no effective laws to govern the issue at all, only prohibitions which, according to Viktor Voronkov, director of the St. Petersburg Center for Independent Social Research, 'guarantee that most immigration remains illegal, a boon to only the black market and the criminalised parts of society'. But the main obstacle to rational immigration guidelines says Vorontkov is a deep fear of being overwhelmed by outsiders. Most feared are the Chinese. Experts say that there are already as many as 200000 Chinese living and working in Russia, mostly in trade and small manufacture.
Some time ago Russian parliament urged the government to step up defenses against the flow of illegal immigrants by revising Russia's free transit regime with neighboring states, and improving the lives of those who are legally in Russia. The head of the foreign affairs committee in the State Duma also called for the criminal code to be tightened, alleging that illegal immigrants are joining outlawed extremist organizations which are linked to criminal organizations.
According to police, around 10 million foreigners live illegally in Russia. Most come from the CIS; the remainders are largely from China and Southeast Asia. One option being considered by the interior ministry is to make it mandatory for foreigners entering Russia to put down a deposit, which would then be used to meet deportation costs, if necessary.
International Organization for Migration urged Russia to legalize the status of up to 15 million migrants living illegally in the country. According to the IOM, the failure to provide a legal framework for migrants was depriving the Russian state of massive tax revenues, fuelling xenophobia and encouraging organized crime and drug-trafficking.
When new legislation was introduced - the aim of which was to replace Soviet-era legislation with new laws that will regulate migratory movements and the use of foreign labor which, according to deputy Nikolai Ovchinnikov is causing Russia serious problems. The legislation will create a data bank on all foreigners living in Russia and set up quotas for work permits according to economic need. But human rights groups believe that the legislation paves the way for deportation of migrants and amounts to a declaration of a 'war against immigrants'.
RELATIONSHIP OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TERRORISM
According UN report
International terrorism is, because of its cross-border dimensions, a migration issue. It touches on a range of matters directly affecting migration policy, including: border integrity (entry and/or residence with illicit intent), national security, integration, ethnic/ multicultural affairs and citizenship.
International terrorism is a test, in extremis, of the degree to which national immigration policies continue to be relevant in an increasingly border-less world. Just as goods, capital and services are moving quickly and with fewer restrictions around the world, in complex globalized networks, so terrorist activities have a supra-national dynamic beyond the reach of many national law enforcement agencies.
While the investigation and prosecution of those associated with any act of terrorism are principally law enforcement matters, the events themselves reinforce the need for governments to constantly re-examine their laws and policies on immigration.
But migration policy, particularly in regard to managing who comes in and out of a country and resides there, is just one area where national and international law enforcement can act against international terrorism.
Actions taken by governments in the wake of 11 September 2001 have focused largely on improved intelligence gathering and sharing within and among affected states and on tightening immigration controls. Since the initial shock of 11 September, some states have introduced further legislative, policy or administrative changes: e.g. to extradite persons found to be associated with terrorism for prosecution in their home countries; in certain situations to rescind their residence status, including citizenship; and detain a broad range of violators of immigration rules based on the possibility that some might be security risks.
However, where punitive measures are involved, there is often only a thin line separating these from the denial/curtailment of individual rights and freedoms enshrined in, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Whatever sensitivities there are in this respect, it is certain that international terrorism inevitably exploits any perceived weakness that could further its objectives. The principles of proportionality and necessity inherent in International Law1 are, to varying degrees, under consideration by governments seeking to take appropriate measures to counter international terrorism. Some of the measures can, in normal circumstances, be regarded by some as extreme.
One of the difficulties associated with measures to combat terrorism on a global scale is the formulation of an appropriate universally accepted definition of terrorism. In Africa, for example, political leaders have had to grapple with what occurred during various wars of liberation against colonial imperialism in their countries; and as a consequence, have often taken a restrictive approach to the issue, frequently leading to definitional compromise. Some countries singled out for acts of extreme violence directed at infrastructure or innocent populations may see the need to take a more resolute, assertive approach.
Since 11September 2001, more attempts have been made at both national and regional levels to strengthen or introduce policy and legal provisions against international terrorism.
IOM agrees with some observers that, while immigration policy may not be central to counter terrorism, it can be an important vehicle for addressing it, particularly to ensure better application of law enforcement and intelligence. Immigration authorities can contribute to national/international intelligence through direct encounters with migrants, both legal and illegal migrants, and through partner networks with other law enforcement and immigration agencies.
Broader migration policy can also help address aspects of social stability in diverse societies to reduce the potential for ethnic or other conflicts.
Appropriate systems and mechanisms for information sharing among authorities and states need to be in place. But there also needs to be great care in policy, legislation and practice to protect the right of persons to be internationally mobile, and to protect the integrity of regular migration regimes.
There are five broad areas in which states around the globe have instituted or increased measures in a bid to close loopholes that can be exploited by terrorist networks. These are described in some length below:
Any action taken by a Government impacting on human rights must be proportional to the threat to which it is seeking to respond. It must stand in reasonable relation to what is necessary to, for example, address security concerns. The principle of proportionality also requires that where measures are taken, which could violate certain human rights (as permitted in certain circumstances under international human rights law, for example in times of national emergency), then these measures must be reviewed at regular intervals by independent national bodies. Exceptional measures must remain exceptional, be of limited duration and be enforced only when strictly necessary.
The Russian - Europe border is the new front line in the battle against the increasingly sophisticated traffic in human beings.But it is also the front line in a lesser known struggle - against what the United States Government believes could be a route for members of terrorist organizations into Europe.
Copyright 2004 Victor Fersht
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